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While Tsai’s work is less shared than Wong’s, a similar sentiment applies. The current streaming ecosystem makes his films readily available to a mass international audience, despite how Tsai, who considers himself a non-commercial director, has struggled to attract a mainstream Taiwanese viewership.

Social media compresses their old works into something consumable and relatable for a Western audience, occasionally stripping away the naturalistic cadence of the film. (Rebels is noticeably slower than Chungking, with Tsai purposefully dwelling on characters doing “normal” things, like walking around or lying about their apartments.) Still, there is something poetic about this digital transfiguration. Thanks to the popularity of streaming services, Rebels of the Neon God and Chungking Express, two distinct films about alienation within urban spaces, can be watched alone in the privacy of one’s home. As lonely as that may seem, I find it comforting; there is a communal feeling within the individual experience of rediscovering cult classics that so keenly reflect how life is isolating, no matter how connected we seem to other people.

Rebels of the Neon God is available to stream on Prime Video. Chungking Express is on HBO Max. For more recommendations from the world of culture, check out the One Good Thing archives.

The dire situation ultimately prompted the United Nations and the United States to begin issuing sanctions exemptions to allow the free flow of humanitarian assistance. The US continued to expand on these “general licenses,” which allowed more and more transactions over time. In late February, the Treasury Department issued a general license that gave private companies and NGOs the legal cover to do a wide range of transactions, including with governing institutions in Afghanistan — even those headed up by sanctioned individuals.

The US “definitively and categorically said sanctions on the Taliban do not mean that all engagement with or economic activity with the Afghan government is sanctioned,” said Andrew Watkins, senior expert in Afghanistan at the United States Institute of Peace. In other words, it largely permitted the majority of economic activity that foreign actors might want to have with Afghanistan.

“That hasn’t sent people rushing back into Afghanistan,” Watkins added.

As some experts told me, this licensing process was too gradual and took too long. Businesses had already ended their dealings with Afghanistan and, because of the many uncertainties, didn’t see it as a worthwhile investment to return. Foreign banks and entities are still scared they might end up inadvertently violating sanctions rules, or that the rules might change.

“The problem was everybody had to figure out: ‘Okay, what does this license cover? And how far open is this? Are there things I can’t do even within the license?’” said Jeffrey Grieco, president and CEO of the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce. “The Afghan business guys are not lawyers in the US. They’re just trying to sell food and import wheat and import rice.”

All of that has created a deterrent effect that is hard to overcome. Afghan businesses are struggling to export and import goods, or even get parts to fix machinery from suppliers to produce things at home. “Once you tell them these materials go to Afghanistan, they just ignore you,” said one Afghan businessman, who was granted anonymity to protect his safety.

The conundrum of Afghanistan’s central bank funds

Deepening the paralysis of the Afghan economy is the freeze on DAB’s assets. The country does not have a functioning central bank, so it lacks the tools to ease some economic constraints, like lack of liquidity or high inflation.

 Scott Peterson/Getty Images
A woman has her ration card checked as the World Food Program distributes a critical monthly food ration to 400 families in Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, on January 17.

The central bank assets are also the most visible and symbolic element of the battle over Afghanistan’s future. Treasury froze the assets in August 2021; soon after, some 9/11 victims’ families began pursuing the funds as potential compensation in terrorist judgments against the Taliban and others.

The Biden administration was in some ways boxed in by this litigation, which is still weaving through the courts and may not ultimately succeed. But in February, the White House issued an executive order that set aside about half of the assets for possible compensation in the lawsuit, and committed about $3.5 billion “for the benefit of the Afghan people,” which would be made available through a third-party trust.

The move angered many critics, who say the assets belong fully to the Afghan people. Afghan advocates and others have also challenged the legality of using these reserves for a judgment in this suit, since the Afghan people bear no responsibility for 9/11, and doing so would likely prolong the crisis in Afghanistan.

“The change of the government shouldn’t lead to the freezing of assets in the case when, for example, a country doesn’t recognize the results of an election or [the] overthrow of government. It’s money of the state; it’s not money of the government,” said Alena Douhan, the United Nations special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.

With the executive order, the administration tried to guarantee that some of the assets would return to Afghanistan in some form, though it’s still not clear what form that might be. And many see the central bank funds as an urgent component necessary for ameliorating Afghanistan’s economic precarity. “You’re going to need to give them aid, but you’re also going to need to figure out how to restore some elements of their economy, so they can slowly move toward greater levels of sufficiency,” said Masuda Sultan, co-founder of Unfreeze Afghanistan, a campaign calling for the release of the assets.

Shah Mehrabi, a professor of economics at Montgomery College and member of the Board of Governors of Da Afghanistan Bank, has proposed restoring the funds through a limited, monitored release. “We want to be able to prop up the value of the afghani and stabilize prices, and then help meet the needs of ordinary Afghans,” he said. “That’s the whole purpose of what we want to do is to avoid financial sector crisis, and to allow businesses who are having difficulty to be able to pay for imports to be able to do that.”

 Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images
A Taliban fighter stands guard as women wait in line as the World Food Program distributes cash in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2021.

Some proponents favor releasing funds in waves, carefully monitored in case the Taliban abuses the funds. But even within that proposal, there are debates as to whether it should be done through some sort of separate mechanism, like a third-party trust, or through the DAB itself, which, though technically independent, is now being run by a Taliban official.

It’s also still a question of how successfully Afghanistan’s DAB can manage those funds. The chill of sanctions and lack of foreign investment may mean there are limits to how much these reserves can repair the economy. Many of the top leaders of the bank also fled after Afghanistan’s fall, and others are trying to leave or have been pushed out of positions by Taliban leadership. “They are not willing to use people who can work: technocrats, the experts that are already there, at home; they go to work, they have no role. And every day that passes, they become more irrelevant,” said Aref Dostyar, senior adviser at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and a former Afghan government official.

And politically, it’s difficult for the US to release these funds as long as the Taliban remains in charge. “The US can’t really just say, ‘Okay, you know what, we’re going to unfreeze your central bank funds and essentially insert liquidity in the economy,’ because that really looks like you’re essentially letting the Taliban get away with it,” Afzal, of the Brookings Institution, said.

Which means it is possible that — even if Afghanistan’s plight worsens — these assets could stay frozen until there is a democratically elected Afghan government, or at least until the Taliban leaves or changes.

The Taliban are not doing themselves — or the Afghan people — any favors

Except the Taliban are not changing. In March, in Qatar, the US planned to begin discussions with the Taliban about economic issues, including those frozen funds, but talks fell apart after the Taliban issued their decree stopping girls from attending secondary school.

The Taliban are content to blame the West, and especially the US, for Afghanistan’s suffering — but their continued human rights violations and ideological extremism have kept Afghanistan cut off from the world. The Taliban continue to curtails women’s rights, like barring girls from attending school beyond sixth grade after they promised they would allow it. The Taliban’s restrictions on freedom of movement for women and girls, and on employment outside the home, have added to the economic strain, as they can’t earn income or seek access to things like health care.

The Taliban have also continued to target civil society. They embarked on revenge killings of former members of the Afghan security forces, and human rights groups have documented arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings across the country, along with the targeting of minority groups.

 Ahmad Sahel Arman/AFP via Getty Images
Afghan women and girls protest in front of the Ministry of Education in Kabul, Afghanistan, on March 26, demanding that high schools be reopened for girls.

The Taliban are still a very secretive and shadowy organization. There are likely some members who do want to try to build a functioning government, but others see the Taliban’s retrograde vision for the world as central to the organization’s character, and do not necessarily want to have a good relationship with the outside world.

“They see these pro-engagement voices as a threat to the Taliban’s identity,” Rahimi, of the American University of Afghanistan, said. If the Taliban moderate their behavior, they may do so at the expense of internal legitimacy.

In some ways, the central bank funds and sanctions are the two points of leverage still available to the West, the things it can use to pressure the Taliban on reforms. So far, that has not been successful. But it is also risky, to make what should be a matter of basic human rights into a kind of quid pro quo — and there are few guarantees the Taliban will keep its word, or work to the benefit of the Afghan people.

Afghanistan, still on the brink

Afghans in the country, or who do business in Afghanistan, all say a version of the same thing: Nobody has any money.

Fixing that requires ending Afghanistan’s isolation, which requires a menu of things: easing sanctions, releasing central bank funds, and encouraging or incentivizing reinvestment. These are all difficult options because of the political situation. Without them, Afghanistan risks being trapped on the precipice of humanitarian catastrophe.

There are improvements on the margins. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has physically delivered batches of cash to Afghanistan. The World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which previously financed Afghan government programs, has announced that it will fund three programs worth nearly $800 million.

These are just small measures in the bigger crisis. According to one UN estimate, Afghanistan will still require about $200 million in humanitarian assistance each month. In March, the United Nations sought to raise a record $4.4 billion for Afghanistan, the largest-ever appeal for a single country. It raised $2.4 billion, with the US contributing $204 million. (As of May, the US has set aside $720 million for Afghanistan since mid-August 2021, according to the State Department.) But some advocates and experts worry that it will be difficult for the world to meet or sustain such a level of support, especially with so much international focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Afghanistan avoided some of the most dire predictions of this winter because of humanitarian aid successes. But with suffering on a country-wide scale, anything — a natural disaster, global food shocks — can push it even deeper into crisis. “It’s not just going to go away if we want it to go away,” Dostyar, the former Afghan official, said. “What it does is that it will multiply the amount of the trouble that will haunt us again, later.”

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